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The Constitution of Human Dignity 
 




A constitution is the basic structure of a complex, unified reality, which is thought to have a 
normative or regulative function. In the case of a state, the constitution is laid down, i.e., it is 
elaborated, adopted, proclaimed and promulgated in and by a community. In the case of a person, 
a constitution is presupposed, even if medicine may improve it and sleeping rough might ruin it1.  
 
The analogy of constitution inspired the early phenomenologists to talk about ’constitutional 
analysis’. To them, following Husserl, constitution is a function of the transcendental ego in and 
through which various acts cohere in order for a unity (e.g. a physical object) to appear2. It 
designates at the same time something which has to be taken for granted (as in the case of the 
constitution of a person), and something which is enacted or made (as in the case of a state’s 
constitution). This it does in accordance with how unity appear: At the same time with imposing 
evidence and through a laborious effort. 
 
The constitution of human dignity refers on the one hand to the way in which the phenomenon of 
human dignity appears to us. It also refers, however, in analogy with Hayek’s The Constitution of 
Liberty3, to the building of our civilization on the fundamental value of human dignity. The 
Declaration of Human Rights together with the Covenant of Human Rights play a role in the 
international community comparable to that of a constitution, and they explicitly refer to human 
dignity as what validates them. Hayek envisages a culture of liberty informing judiciary and 
administration alike. Analogously the ”Constitution of Human Dignity” could refer to a culture of 
human dignity, over and above the written documents of the United Nations4.  
 
The values that found our civilisation and our apprehension of these basic principles are as 
inseparable as noema and noesis. This is what I want to bring out in the following, by first 
examining the nature of constitutional analysis (1), and enlarge its scope to values (2), then  
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direct attention to the constitution of the other in recognition (3), and how recognition is 
motivated (4). Finally I will proceed to the constitution analysis itself (5).  
 
 
1. What is Constitutional Analysis? 
 
The idea of constitutional analysis is inextricably linked to the work of Edmund Husserl (1959 - 
1938). It occupied a central position in the development of his thought from phenomenological 
psychology to transcendental phenomenology. In his programmatic Ideas, he characterised 
constitution-analysis as the central viewpoint of phenomenology5 and believed phenomenology 
as a whole to relate to the possible constitution of objects6. 
 
Constitution is the function through which identification takes place. It designates the way in 
which an object is built up and brought to appear as a unified whole7. This seems to indicate that 
anything unified - be it percieved, categorical, imaginary or even vague - would qualify for 
constitutional analysis. However, Husserl generally reserve ’constitution’ to objects of 
objectivating acts8. Any object can be analysed as constituted within consciousness, in its 
structure and its elements, as well as in the kind of acts in which this structure and these elements 
are given9. That objects are constituted, or that they can be analyzed as such, therefore means that 
their structure can be rendered intuitable and be described. Constitution-analysis is a way of 
handling phenomena by breaking them down into their intuitable elements, or, to put it another 
way, a procedure which reveals the intelligibility of the thing by demonstrating how it is 
apprehended10. 
 
Ideas describes constitution as a function which is more or less automatic, as distinct from acts, 
which are intentional11. A function, however, functions in and through acts, in particular in the 
natural attitude, where we constitute unreflectedly12. It is only by suspending the judgement as to 
the reality of what we constitute, and by reflecting on what we do when we constitute - i.e. on the 
acts in which constitution takes place, - that we become aware of the field of constitutional 
phenomenology. Empirical entities are said on the one hand to constitute themselves, and on the 
other to be constituted by consciousness. This last expression stresses the dependance of the 
entities on consciousness, and the fact that they are relative to the acts in which they are 
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apprehended13. But as self-constituted, objects appear according to their essence through a 
function of the ego, which is beyond will or activity in any phenomenal sense.  
 
The constitution of categorical objects is more linguistically accessible than percieved objects. 
Some, no doubt, would claim that all objects are categorical, i.e. graspable only in relation to 
something else, or on the background of difference. To constitute a categorical object is, in 
Sokolowski’s words, ”to bring it to light, to articulate it, to bring it forth, to actualize its truth”14. 
In fact, the term human dignity seems to accomplish two logical functions at the same time and 
thus refer to two categorical objects: It is the dignity of human beings and the kind of dignity 
which is human15. This seems possible only if human dignity is essential to being human, not a 
mere part of it, and this may well be what the expression ’human dignity’ implicitly affirms16. So 
our task will be to bring this ’hyper-categorical’ object to light, to articulate it, bring it forth and 
actualize its truth. Or even better: to let it manifest itself to us17. This entails constituting the 
objects upon which the categorical objects are founded, whether this be human being or 
axiomatic value.  
 
Whereas human beings are constituted as empirical psychic personalities, pure experience qua 
experience, is not18. Pure experience, of which constitution is a function - or the function - , is the 
indescribabale condition for constitution19, and this could very well be what we designate 
spontaneously as ’dignity’20. Perhaps the normative element present in the expression human 
dignity is best addressed if we analyse it as a value. Value is, however, for Husserl, always 
founded upon the object21, it is not, as it is for Scheler, objective in itself22. In so far as human 
dignity is a kind of dignity, it is a value best analysed as objective in itself. We must therefore, for 
the moment, in order to address this aspect, turn from Husserl’s phenomenology to Scheler’s 
theory of values. Later, in 3., we will pick up the thread of the constitution of foreign constitution 





2. The Constitution of Values 
 
Scheler very rarely uses the term ’constitution’, and explicitly denies that values are constituted. 
They are, in the hierarchy they form, apriori, and this seems to imply that they are in need of no 
foundation outside the origin provided by personal preference. We therefore look in vain to 
Scheler for an analysis referred to as ’the constitution of values’. What we do find, however, is a 
vision of the correllation between values, feelings and the person, and an indication of how 
values appear within consciousness. They appear to the subject in feeling but they also appear as 
objective in others, namely in the way the adoption of values is formative of character or 
personality in them. To Scheler the person reveals him- or herself in the values adopted: the value 
hierarchy which determines his or her world-view is the closest we can come to the essence of the 
person. A person is therefore always individual and also inversely layered in comparison with the 
value-hierarchy, so that the highest values corresponds to the deepest layers of the person. The 
lowest values are those of the hedonist, who prefers the agreable, activating only the physio-
sensual surface of the person. The attributes of the hero – courage, glory, fame or in general the 
noble – corresponds in contradistinction to a deeper, psychic, level of the person, whereas the 
values of the genius, such as knowledge and brilliance, corresponds to the yet more interior level 
of the spirit. Above all these values, the values of the sacred gleams through from the deepest 
levels of the personality of the saint23. It forms part of the essential relations of the realm of 
value-objectivities, that values are higher or lower; i.e. that they form a hierarchy and are relative 
to one another24. Preference, the act in which the value hierarchy is established, provides a 
perspective to the constitution of the world as a whole. Preference for the agreable will constitute 
the world of a hedonist, preference for the sacred will constitute that of a saint. Love is the only 
factor which makes the person realize the hierarchy of values as it is; it is the only factor which 
can influence preference, as it always enhances experience by revealing the higher values. Thus 
love, for Scheler, is the ultimate principle of realism25.  
 
This primacy of love means two things: First, Scheler does not regard the theoretical approach to 
the world to be the primary one, as Husserl did when he characterised value-apprehension as 
founded on theoretical acts, or as Kant did when he characterised the person as the logical subject 
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of rational acts26. The person experiences the world emotively before he experience it rationally. 
Second, the person is primary in relation to constitution. The transcendental ego recedes for the 
person who is in love responsive to values even before he apprehends, understands, identifies or 
constitutes27. To Scheler, therefore, the person is the condition of the world, and in this primacy 
consists her axiomatic value. To himself he is absolutely indispensable, no matter what value-
hierarchy he adopts: he is axiomatic to value. Yet it might still be only Love, that orders 
preference thus, that personal value is valued above any other value. Scheler in fact states that 
’the value of the person remains the highest value of the values’28. 
 
Values, to Scheler, constitute a special domain of objectivities, but their objectivity is a priori 
and ideal. This means that they do not need to be constituted in a bearer of values to excercise 
their attraction. They are pregiven to any content of representation, and consequently human 
dignity does not need to be instantiated, for me to adopt it as a value. Indeed, my adoption of the 
value does not force me to recognize it whereever it is present. Only love could. This is illustrated 
by the phenomenon of ressentment, where we ’re-prefer’ the values we are not able to strive for 
into negative ones, and thus exercise the empire preference gives us over values and the 
appearance of the world. However, values are constituted as ’having to be constituted’ – this is 
what love is responsive to. Values appeal to us: they ’ought to be’ both recognized and realised. 
They thus present themselves to us with a claim to reality, as potentially objective29. 
 
The hierarchy of values is established in preference according to five criteria: (1) durability 
(whether the values last or not), (2) divisibility (whether they diminish from being shared), (3) 
foundation (whether they are founded by other values), (4) depth of satisfaction (to what personal 
depth they correspond) and (5) relativity (whether they found other values)30. These criteria could 
be said to be the reasons for preferring. They are, according to Scheler, experiental and cannot be 
found on mere reflexion. This insertedness into experience is of course also what makes them 
contestable. Are they what in fact makes people prefer, or are they what ought to make them 
prefer? Are they part of the preferred outlook or are they constituted independently?31 In either 
case they conspire to make the value of human dignity stand out as among the highest of the 
values, or as the highest: Human dignity lasts throughout the trials common to men: poverty, 
misfortune, illness and dying; it even shines most clearly in these situations; it is among the most 
lasting values we know (1). It is threatened only when others are involved in breaking down the 
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personality, as is the case of torture, and then it is not quite certain whether it is the dignity of the 
torturer or that of the tortured which is in danger. This illustrates that human dignity is something 
held in common. Human dignity, in fact, is shared by all in equal measure – there might be no 
positive value so evenly distributed among men. Hence, human dignity is not diminished from 
being shared, but is rather enhanced, both in the person sharing and recognizing it and in the one 
with whom he shares it or in whom he recognizes it (2). Human dignity acquires sense in relation 
to very few other values. It may be explained in relation to Nature, God, Reason or Society, but 
as it is the highest value shared between the outlooks which takes these factors to be central, it 
may well be the least relative or the most basic value we know of (3)32. Human dignity is felt as 
deeply satisfying because it affirms one’s own axiomatic value at the same time as it is affirmed 
in the other (4). Human dignity founds other values such as care, hospitality, fairness, justice, 
benevolence and indeed all those we find expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights (5). 
 
 
3. The Constitution of the Other 
 
The constitution of the other appears to us as absolutely obligatory because of his axiomatic 
value. However, this obligation is shunned by any one or any philosophy with the slightest 
solipsistic tendency. Hannah Arendt explains this shyness by the functional solitariness of 
thinking, which is disturbed or even prevented from operating by the presence of others33. 
Solipsism is in fact a challenge which always has to be met anew, and the constitution of the 
other is the meeting of that challenge. The challenge is objective and personal at the same time; it 
cannot be avoided and it affects us deeply. The constitution of the other comes about in the act of 
recognition, in which I at the same time and for the same reasons recognize myself and someone 
else like myself34. The experience of recognition in which the other is constituted, also is the 
experience in which human dignity is constituted. 
 
Recognition relies on the acceptance of cognizance. It presupposes cognizance as well as the 
establishment of the object of this cognizance as ”the same” as something else, as of the same 
kind. We can recognize something as something (e.g. my pen), something as someone (e.g. a 
soldier in khaki disguise), someone as something (a human being, a teacher, a good scientist), and 
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finally someone simply as someone (a person). The recognition of something requires memory 
and ability to categorize. The recognition of someone requires reflexivity, and, as I in this kind of 
recognition learn what kind of an I, I am myself, it relies on recognition of the first kind. It is not 
possible to recognise someone who is not identifiable35.  
 
Our criteria for sameness are perplexing, yet Aristotle’s definition is still useful: ’Sameness is 
clearly a kind of unity in the being, either of two or more things, or of one thing treated as more 
than one’36. The act of recognition, recognizing the same in something else or in another, 
constitutes a unity between two objects; a person and an object, or between myself and another 
who is like me. Diplomats constitutes this reality between states, and communication does 
between people. It is a reality vital for peace. How is it established?  
 
The other responds to me in a way objects do not. He co-responds, in fact, not only by being 
constituted as a psycho-physical individual like me, but also (in and through being thus 
constituted), by being an I, like I am. This means that whereas his constitution is like mine, he is 
also beyond constitution, as the unity of experience. Admitting another I amounts to admitting 
that I am only one of a kind, an I, one way among others of constituting experience. Moreover, he 
prefers, as I prefer, and we may not prefer the same things. This again implies that his world may 
be constituted differently from mine because the values through which he views it are different. 
Accepting him as another I therefore means that the world may be different from what I percieve 
it to be.  
 
Edith Stein claims that empathy is the kind of act in which foreign experience is given37. It is 
akin, of course, to perception, but what is constituted is objective and incarnate experience38 
simultaneously in myself and in the other. It is thus through empathy that the individual psycho-
physical person is constituted in myself as in the other. Empathy, however, is not like 
constitution, a quasi-automatic function of the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego 
constitutes simply a human being, whereas empathy is an act, which persons can pose or not 
pose. The person unable or unwilling to empathize does not constitute a shared world39, even if 
he may percieve other human beings. Human dignity, however, is constituted only in beings, with 




To Hegel recognition happens in the dialectics of self-consciousness, when a self meets another, 
failing to be this other by either possessing it or by being possessed by it, and thus emerging as 
the same as the other, which, as another, cannot be a possession. It is a failure which reveals that 
self-consciousness cannot be possessed without failing to be what it is, and thus failure turns to 
the victory of recognition. Hegel envisages this process to be, as he calls it, a moment in the 
development of the Spirit in-and-for-itself. What is truly happening in recognition is definitely a 
recognition of oneself, on the one hand as reflected in the eyes of the other and on the other as 
someone to whom the other is another self. Self and other are correlative terms, not only in the 
system of Hegel, but in the reality they reflect. In hegelian terms it would be possible to say, thus 
giving another expression to match an aspect of Stein’s insight, that the constitution of the self 
and the constitution of the other are mutually dependant. 
 
However, the difference between the hegelian perspective and that of Stein is the role played by 
the body and personal individuality and hence also by the objectivity constituted in which I 
recognize myself. For Hegel what matters is one self-consciousness recognizing itself in another, 
in order for it to surpass this difference into the concept of reason and ultimately into that of the 
Spirit. Personal individuality is merely a moment in the revelation of the Spirit to itself and 
bodily objectivity is only an obstacle necessarily invented by the Spirit for its own self-
expression. The value of the individual human being is therefore insignificant in relation to that 
of the Spirit, and the idea that it would have axiomatic value would exemplify a moment 
comparable to that of the unhappy consciousness. 
 
To Stein the role of empathy is not a transitory one. Awareness of foreign experience does give 
rise to intersubjectivity and therefore to a higher level of objectivity, but it is not surpassable into 
what she calls community-consciousness, even if the person is formed or molded by this latter40. 
The individual person alone is capable of feeling, and this, therefore, becomes a symbol of his 
individuality. The state, or the community which is its foundation, is dependent on individual 
persons to shape or direct its response to values, because it cannot itself feel41. Stein thus 
underlines the individual origin of value-perception and makes it clear that personality rooted in 
psycho-physical individuality has axiomatic value, because it is axiomatic in relation to value. 
Moreover, the recognition of personal individuality is always mediated by the body, as what I 




The unity established in recognition is for Hegel that of the Spirit beyond individual persons, but 
for Stein it is the very unity of the individual spiritual person. For Hegel, what makes me 
recognize the other is his defiance of death (whether hemmed in in work or bursting forth in 
power); for Stein, it is his body, sensing and sensible like my own, a body manifesting me as of a 
recognisable kind, the human kind. It also is the centre for my identification as white, healthy, 
and educated. If I take these unities to be essential to me as an I, I will recognize others only of 
the same kind. What I will then recognize is not human dignity, and I cannot fail to recognise it in 
others without failing to recognise it in myself.  
 
However, apart from himself, I have as many reasons to prefer not to constitute the other as I 
have to do it. He challenges my worldview with his difference-in-sameness and therefore prevent 
me from thinking what I want, even as he also co-constitutes the objective world with me. 
Moreover, he may be useless, disagreable and even bad. He may, of course, also be useful, 
pleasant and good. These accidental reasons for constituting or not constituting him may make 
me take cognizance of him, and even force me to take account of him. But they cannot force me 
to recognize him as an equal in human dignity. So, how am I motivated to proceed from 





Motivation, in Stein’s words, ’is the connection that acts get into with one another: (..) an 
emerging of the one out of the other for the sake of the other’42. It takes place at all levels of 
cognizance. Intimations motivate perceptions, perceptions motivates the seeing of something in 
particular. This something motivates me to conceptualize it, and the way I conceptualize it will 
motivate me to take a stand in relation to it. This stand, of course, or attitude, will be motivated 
by the object as it is motivating my conceptualization of it, and it will, in turn, motivate my action 
at the level of the will. All these levels of motivation are under influence by the will, even if only 
the attitude can be directly commanded by it.  
 
Recognition is, as a mental act, also motivated. It presupposes cognizance and acceptance: 
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cognizance as a stance towards the state of affairs, acceptance towards conviction. Cognizance 
motivates acceptance; so that it is only on the background of acceptance that we can talk about 
genuine recognition43. But recognition is motivated by the motive I ’make’ of the state of affairs. 
Stein claims that the mental act is ’rational’ when it is entirely grounded in the state of affairs, 
when, therefore, no ’foreign’ motive motivates it44. Recognition or non-recognition is of course 
not unintelligible when it is based on motives differing from the state of affairs, indeed 
knowledge of the motives render it understandable, as motivated, however, by something else 
than cognizance45. 
 
Recognizing only those we have an interest in recognizing is very common. It takes mainly two 
forms: Recognizing those I can benefit from recognizing, and not recognizing those I would not 
profit from recognizing. This strategic recognition makes use of the three step process cognizance 
– acceptance – recognition to distinguish between these two categories. I may recognize human 
dignity as an axiomatic value out of self-interest, but it is unlikely that I will recognize it in all 
those from whose recognition I would not benefit. 
 
Whereas positive values are in principle always beneficial, the experience of them is not always 
felt as such. Sometimes values are emptily grasped, like an object can be emptily grasped, when I 
know it only from hearsay. Likewise we can cognize an object without realizing its value 
emotionally, but we cannot recognize a person without at least emptily grasping his value. The 
dryness of this condition makes Kant talk about it being a duty, and makes him claim that respect 
is a rational attitude, motivated exclusively by the dignity of the moral law or its legislator46. 
Respect, however, makes no distinction between lawgiver and subject and does consequently not 
identify empirically who is concerned by the categorical imparative. This may in fact correspond 
to the experience we have that human dignity is not always in practice recognized, even when it 
is in principle, and earnestly, affirmed. But the categorical imperative only explains the 
constitution of human dignity in so far as humanity itself is regarded as a kind of dignity, and 
thus serves as the empirical basis for the identification of dignity. 
 
Perhaps only love is in the very last analysis capable of identifying who is a moral subject. Kind-
ness, the attitude of being of the same kind as the other, does, however, go a long way towards it. 
Moreover it seems we do this naturally. Most people, in fact, think we constitute human dignity 
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naturally, by this meaning something like: we do it without thinking, it takes little or no effort, 
and it really is self-explanatory. Aristotle defines ’nature’ as the genesis of growing things, and 
the immanent principle from which a thing grows47. What is natural, is in accordance with this 
principle of growth. To recognize naturally could therefore mean, that to recognize this pattern of 
growth in others is part of our own pattern and process of growth. It also means that it is good to 
do it, in the same way as it is good that the cow gives milk and that roses bloom. It is beautiful, 
harmonious, perfect: it should not be disturbed. 
 
 
5. The Constitution of Human Dignity 
 
No matter the motivation, human dignity can be analysed as constituted by its noetic and 
noematic elements. 
 
What is constituted (the noematic side) is a hyper-categorical object, accomplishing two logical 
functions simultaneously, that of qualifying a kind of dignity as human, and that of identifying 
the human kind as axiomatically valuable.  
 
The act in which this is constituted (the noetic side) is recognition. Recognition on the one hand 
of a kind (the human kind), and on the other of a kind beyond kinds (the constitutive and 
valuating power of the I). Recognition means that what is constituted is constituted in myself and 
in the other simultaneously . It concerns me essentially, because I am also of this natural kind of 
axiomatic value. I also am of the same kind of being, the human kind. Recognition could also be 
of other features than humanity and of other dignities than the human. But then, of course, it 
would not be of human dignity. 
 
The constitution of human dignity is a personal as well as a political challenge, because my own 
value as human is constituted as the same as – not merely similar to – that of all human beings. 
The recognition of myself as human, and as axiomatically valuable because of it, depends on this. 
My value as a self is constituted as the same as – not merely as similar to – that of all other 
selves. The recognition of my self as a self, and as valuable because I am myself, depends on this. 
Communication and community is founded on this universal ’law’ of reciprocity. The society 
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which bases its constitution on the basic principle of human dignity thus favours community. The 
one which does not, does not. Human dignity inaugurates community subjectively, because it 
enables the individual to recognize others as well as itself. Human dignity inaugurates community 
objectively, because the state which adopts it in its constitution recognizes that the point of 
institutionalizing a community is to assist its growth. The values that found our civilisation and 
our apprehension of these basic principles are in fact inseparable, because the constitution of 
human dignity is a kind of covenant between the self and its other selves, presenting them as 








                                                 
1There seems to be no enactment of the constitution of a person, unless one would designate the fusion of gametes 
and thus the forming of the genetic code of the individual as the act or event in which the constitution is ’laid down’. 
As in the case of a state’s constitution, there could, however, be various stages in the laying down of the constitution. 
2
 Husserl, Edmund: Ideas: General introduction to Pure Phenomenology, transl. by Boyce Gibson (Allen and 
Unwin/The MacMillan Company, 1931), §86. In accordance with a more contemporary idiom this function is 
sometimes referred to as social construction. See Dermot Moran: Introduction to Phenomenology (Routledge, 2000) 
IV,3. 
3
 Magna Carta was also by Henry Bracton called Constitutio Libertatis (De Legibus, fol. 186b). 
4
 Hayek, Friedrich A. von: The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, 1960). If one should suggest what this culture 
comprises, one is not likely to construct a program of a political party, in the same way as Hayek launches the party-
program of libertarianism. Human dignity does not divide political interests, at least not in the present political 
situation. However, one is bound to mention the following factors among those promoted by the culture of human 
dignity: The value of the individual human person and its consequent individualism and egalitarianism; democracy; 
universal sufferage; the rule of law; general, compulsary education; appreciation of cultural diversity; acceptance of 
refugees and immigration; rejection of torture, and social welfare. The human rights tradition finds its root and 
legitimation in the culture of human dignity. However, the proceduralisation of human rights has created a political 
situation where factions fight for the recognition of opposite and incompatible sets of rights. This proceduralisation 
has become possible because human rights instruments (whether on the international or on the continental level) have 
gained status as quasi-positive law. The old labels of ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ might still be useful to designate the 
political factions of this struggle, if it is remembered that a social democrat can be ‘conservative’ and a faschist 
‘liberal’ as well as the other way around. The drama of this struggle sometimes overshadows the outstanding 
achievement of the civilization of human dignity. 
5
 Ideas §86. 
6
 Ideas §135. Moreover ’the problem of the constituting function clearly betokens nothing further than that the 
regulated series of appearances which necessarily hold together within the unity of a single appearing object are open 
to intuition, and can be theoretically apprehended - and this in spite of their infinities (which in and through its 
determinate ”and so forth” can be unequivocally controlled) - that they can be analysed and described in their own 
eidetic peculiarity, and that the law-conforming function of the correllation between the determinate appearing object 
as unity and the determinately infinite multiplicities of appearances can be fully seen into and so disrobed of all its 
mysteries’ (§150). 
7
 According to Sokolowski, Robert: The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 
200–1, the term ’constitution’ expresses the relationship between an absolute (which constitutes) and its 
corresponding relative (which is constituted ). Husserl’s idea of constitution was, according the his assistant Fink, 
very close to the idea of creation. It therefore is accompanied by a sense of the responsibility of the subject or the 
intersubjective community in relation to what it constitutes. However, Husserl is careful never to call constitution an 
act, even less an action (even if he does call it intentional), and does not either provide us with a theory of action, 
which could help us to distinguish between constitution and mental action. Arendt, Hannah: Life of the Mind 
(Hartcourt and Brace, 1971), Vol. I, p. 7 points to ’modernity’s crucial conviction that I can know only what I myself 
can make’, and to the fact that ’Husserl’s phenomenology sprang from the anti-historical and anti-metaphysical 
implications of the slogan Zu den Sachen selbst!’ (ibid. p. 9). The collapse of the distinction between theory of action 
and theory of knowledge is the core of the anti-metaphysical heritage of modernity, and this heritage is also 
Husserl’s. This heritage is what I try to employ in this article to explain how human dignity is concieved. 
8
 The exceptions are the ego and the stream of experience. The first is constituted as the pole of experience and the 
second constitutes itself in its own experience. 
9
 Husserl uses already in Philosophy of Arithmetic the term constitution to designate the mental act in which groups 
are identified or collated. Here constitution designates precisely a non-necessity, an identification which could be said 
to be accidental, relying on the intention of the mathematician as much as on essential characteristics of numbers. In 
the Logical Investigations Husserl expands the field of constitution to comprise both meaning and objects of 
reference. A good example of constitutional analysis is Edith Stein’s analysis of the constitution of the psycho-
physical individual and of the person in On the Problem of Empathy (ICS, 1989). 
10
 There is a mutual dependence between the intuition of essences, and the analysis of the way in which various 
aspects of the appearance of the essence are brought together in a unity for consciousness. Husserl talks about ’two 
different sections of our enquiry, the one bearing on pure subjectivity, the other on that which belongs to the 
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”constitution” of objectivity as referred to its subjective source’ (Ideen §80). He insists that this is a division of two 
sections of enquiry and that whereas eidetics lays the ground for every factual science (§8), the sciences ought to 
thematize and investigate the constitution of their proper objects themselves. First Husserl understood constitution to 
take place from the hyle of sensations. Later, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, for example, the dicotomy 
between a material and a formal component of constitution is given up, and the idea of genetic constitution is introdu-
ced in its stead. Husserl thus comes to realize how also sensations are co-constituted with the object. Spiegelberg, 
Herbert: The Phenomenological Movement (Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), I, p. 178 characterises constitution analysis as 
supplying important insights into the way in which objectivities establish themselves in consciousness.  
11
 Ideas §86. 
12
 In order to reach the phenomenological startingpoint, we must set out of action the ’transcendent theses of nature-
constituting consciousness’ and direct the glance to pure consciousness in its own absolute being. 
13
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